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THE NEW FEDERALISM IN WEST VIRGINIA
THOMAS B. MILLER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written recently about the New Federalism,' a
term used to describe the increasing tendency by state courts to
decide issues under their own constitutions rather than under the
federal constitution. In this, the bicentennial year of the United States
Constitution, it seems particularly appropriate to briefly review some
of the reasons behind this trend, its theoretical bases, and how far
it has progressed in West Virginia.
Courts have generally recognized that many issues arise under
specific provisions of state constitutions for which there is no federal
counterpart. 2 These issues lie peculiarly within the province of state
* B.A. 1950, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1956, West Virginia University College of Law;
Justice, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
of his law clerk, James B. Stoneking, in the preparation of this essay.
I Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court MandatesDuring the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 260 (1972); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. Ray. 489 (1977); Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees
and the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal ProceduresRights and the New Federalism, 1960-1981, 18
GONZ. L. REv. 221 (1982-83); Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68
VA. L. REv. 1085 (1982); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. Rav. 873 (1976); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights,
9 U. BAT. L. Rav. 379 (1980); Schneider, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court
Mandates: A Reconsideration of the Evidence, 7 VAL. U. L. REv. 191 (1973); Sundquist, Construction
of the Wisconsin Constitution-Recurrenceto FundamentalPrinciples, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 531 (1979);
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal ProcedureRevisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729 (1976); Wilkes, More
on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism
in CriminalProcedure:State CourtEvasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Developments
in the Law-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1982); Note,
State ConstitutionalGuarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems of
Federalism, 13 AM. Cmi. L. REv. 737 (1976); Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State
Bills of Rights, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 271 (1973); Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism,
63 TEx. L. REv. 995 (1985); Mosk, State Constitutionalism:Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 Tax.
L. REv. 1081 (1985).
2 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Slack, 327 S.E.2d 416 (,V. Va. 1985) (W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 8bonded indebtedness of counties); White v. Manchin, 318 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1984) (W. VA. CONST.
art. VI, § 12 -state senators must be residents of county and senatorial district); Atchinson v. Erwin,
302 S.E.2d 78 (W. Va. 1983) (W. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 39-local laws not to be passed in enumerated
cases); O'Connor v. Margolin, 296 S.E.2d 892 (W. Va. 1982) (,V. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30 - legislative
act to embrace only one object); Lane v. West Virginia State Bd. of Law Examiners, 295 S.E.2d 670
(W. Va. 1982) (V. VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1-judicial power in supreme court enables it to regulate
and control the practice of law); Killen v. Logan County Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982)
(V. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1-taxation of real and personal property at "true and actual value").
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courts and are not in the main arena of contention. More troublesome problems arise, however, where state courts are called upon
to interpret language in their constitutions which is the same or
similar to language appearing in the United States Constitution. The
main area of engagement centers on the Bill of Rights.' Despite the
similarity in language and the existence of United States Supreme
Court precedents, state courts have often charted their own course
by reading their state constitutional provisions more broadly than
analogous federal provisions. It is this practice which writers call
4
the New Federalism.
What appears to form the heart of the New Federalism debate
is the belief that in recent years the United States Supreme Court
has eroded many of the individual rights previously recognized and
developed by the Warren Court. Much of the impetus for developing
a state constitutional jurisprudence can be traced to a law review
article written in 1977 by Justice William Brennan. 5 After decrying
the Burger Court's conservative trends in the area of civil liberties,
Brennan found consolation in our system's "double source of protection" for individual rights. He called upon states to "breathe
new life" into diminished constitutional guarantees by relying upon
their own constitutions. 6 Encouragement has also come from dissenters in the high court's more conservative decisions, who have
taken pains to remind state courts that they may extend greater
7
protection under state constitutional provisions.
This essay will attempt to highlight the theoretical roots of the
New Federalism. It will also examine some of the practical limi-

' As Professor Williams points out in his article, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional
Law, 63 TEx. L. Rav. 1195 (1985), other areas are implicated such as equal protection principles.
4 The phrase "New Federalism" is usually credited to Professor Wilkes and was first used by
him in his 1974 law review article, supra note 1.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAtv. L. REv. 489
(1977). This issue had not escaped earlier attention by academics. See, e.g., Force, State "Bill of
Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REv. 125 (1969).
6 Brennan, supra note 5, at 503.
7 For two very recent examples, see, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting), and Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor
Howard discussed this point in his earlier article on the resurgence of state courts. Howard, supra

note 1, at 874-75 (citing cases).
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tations which confront state courts in breaking with federal precedents, and the methodology which has been employed in so doing.
Finally, it will review and analyze cases in West Virginia which have
recognized distinctive state constitutional principles.
II.

THEORY

"Federalism" expresses the unique feature of the American system of government whereby two sovereigns coexist, each supreme
within its own sphere.8 It contemplates not only distinct governing
authorities, but also distinct bodies of law. From a broad perspective, then, it seems only natural that the legal protections guaranteed
at the national and state levels should differ. With fifty separate
states, each independently governed and having its own history and
traditions, some disharmony seems inevitable. A handful of commentators would press the point even further. They suggest that state
independence should be encouraged and that disharmony-even on
constitutional issues-is a sign of the system's health and vitality. 9
Other considerations, however, counsel against this trend. Perhaps with the exception of Louisiana, the states in our nation share
a common legal heritage. It cannot be seriously contended that any
state's plan of organization, constitution, and common law were
developed in a vacuum. Quite to the contrary, new states drew heavily upon the law of the national government and their sister states,
often by simply adopting what had been done or said beforehand.10
Today, when a state court is called upon to interpret a provision
in its bill of rights, that provision will typically have deep roots

8

This is perhaps best captured by two constitutional provisions. The supremacy clause in art.
VI, § 2 provides that the "Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . ." However, the national government was
envisioned as a government of limited powers. Those powers which were not surrendered to the
national government were retained by the states. This principle finds expression in the tenth amend-

ment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
9 See, e.g., Symposium: The Washington Constitution, Collins, Reliance on State Constitulions-Beyond the "New Federalism," 8 U. PUGET SouND L_ Rav. vi (1985).
,0See, e.g., THE FotrNDERs' CONSTITUTION, (P. Kurland & R. Lerner 1987); F. THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONsTiTUTION AND ORGANic LAWS (1909).
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which may actually antedate the formation of the republic. This
common historical thread would, in logic at least, dictate a uniform
interpretation.
Some degree of uniformity is also supported by the longstanding
process of "nationalizing" the protections guaranteed under the federal Bill of Rights. Starting in the early twentieth century, constitutional protections formerly applicable only to the national
government were made binding upon the states as "liberty" interests, protected against state encroachments by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This process has helped to foster the view that basic
civil liberties are, and rightly should be, national in their scope.
Given this need for uniformity, the question arises to what extent
a state court should defer to the decisions of our nation's highest
court. Under the Supremacy Clause, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court provide a minimum level of protection, a "floor"
if you will, with respect to constitutional liberties. They do not,
however, mandate a "ceiling," and states are permitted if they so
choose to give greater protection under their own law.' 2 From the
point of view of federal constitutional theory, then, there is no impediment to the development of a state-based constitutional law.
Yet, the question remains: Should states defer to decisions of the
United States Supreme Court for the sake of achieving uniformity?
For several closely related reasons, I believe that state courts
cannot simply blind themselves to decisions of the Supreme Court.
Though most of these reasons will be discussed below, I mention
two here by way of emphasis. First, perhaps the greatest impediment
to state courts in the area of constitutional bill of rights is the lack
of a state jurisprudence upon which to rely. For years, the states

" This point was argued by Justice Richardson in his dissent in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976). In Disbrow, the California court declined to follow
federal precedent holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach a
defendant who took the stand. Justice Richardson noted that the privilege against self.incrimination,
upon which Miranda was based, was a common law privilege which had existed well before being
codified in either the state or federal constitutions. This history, "blithely ignore[d]" by the majority,
demanded a uniform interpretation. 16 Cal. 3d at 119-20, 545 P.2d at 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
12 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975).
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have been willing to cast a deferential eye toward Supreme Court
rulings, and it seems unjustifiable to now ignore helpful federal prec-

edent. Second, a respect for decisions of the Supreme Court flows
from its preeminent status as the highest court in the land under
the federal Constitution. Thus, both the paucity of state-based constitutional law and the very nature of our federal system suggest
that state courts should place reliance upon Supreme Court decisions.
III.

SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Many practical concerns also caution against too great a reliance
upon state constitutions in extending civil liberties protection. Three
such concerns were voiced by Justice Utter of the Washington Su-

preme Court in a recent article: "First, [state courts] must justify
departing from precedents laid down by the United States Supreme
Court . . . Second, they must decide when and how to approach
a state constitutional problem . . . .Finally, they must decide how
to analyze state constitutional provisions with few or no [state] supreme court precedents for guidance."' 3

Other equally important considerations come readily to mind. A
state supreme court rarely enjoys the prestige of the United States
Supreme Court, particularly when it embarks on a more expansive

reading of its own constitutional bill of rights. For this reason, the
task of justifying a departure from settled law only becomes more
exacerbated. Furthermore, it is much easier for a state legislature
to react to "overrule" a state supreme court decision than it is for4
Congress to do so through the cumbersome amendment process.'

"3 Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and
the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SoUND L. Rnv. 491, 492 (1984).
14 The Florida Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of its constitutional search and seizure
provision in Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979), and State v. Dodd, 419 So. 2d 333 (Fla.
1982), is thought to have triggered an amendment requiring it to "be construed in conformity with
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court." FLA. CONsT. art. I § 12 (1885, amended 1968). The Maryland Supreme Court in Johnson
v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978), implemented its "prompt presentment" rule (requiring
persons arrested to be taken promptly to a magistrate) and held that the failure to do so would render
a prior confession invalid. Subsequently, the Maryland legislature enacted a statute to overrule Johnson. Act of May 19, 1981, Ch. 577, 1981 Md. Laws 2326. See generally D. Wilkes, Jr., The New
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As a consequence, rejecting federal precedents may not only promote

tensions with the other branches of state government, but may actually encourage them to thwart court action. Substantial departures
may also draw the ire of the public through the electoral process
or public referendum.1 5

Another consideration which may give a state court pause in
pursuing its own constitutional analysis is the lack of any authoritative approach by other state courts. 16 Without more guidance on
the analytical approach to be used, and a greater confidence in state
courts to faithfully apply it, reliance on independent state authority
becomes transparently result-oriented.
It should also be noted that state courts ate often seriously disadvantaged in attempting to review the history of their own constitutional law. Records of state constitutional debates may be
fragmentary or totally nonexistent. 7 Thus, not only the original intention of the drafters, but even the sources upon which they relied,

Federalism in Criminal Procedures in 1984: Death of the Phoenix, Conference of Chief Justices,
National Conference on Developments in State Constitutional Law (Mar. 9, 1984).
Similarly, when the West Virginia court held in Killen v. Logan County Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d
689 (W. Va. 1982), that under article X, § l(b) of the West Virginia Constitution, real property had
to be assessed at true and actual value, the legislature responded by proposing the "Property Tax
Limitation and Homestead Exemption Amendment of 1982." W. VA. CoNsr. art. X, § l(b) (1872,
amended 1982). This amendment was adopted November 2, 1982, and fixed assessments at 60 percent
of true and actual value, with the right to establish a higher percentage if approved by two-thirds
of the members of each house of the legislature.
IS Perhaps the most extreme example of popular reaction was the passage in June, 1982 of
Proposition 8, also known as the California Victims' Bill of Rights. It amended the California Constitution to provide that "[e]xcept as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of
the membership in each house of the legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding[.]" CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(d) (1879, amended 1982). The obvious impact of the amendment is to prohibit the state supreme court from fashioning any state-law based exclusionary rule,
subject only to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.
11In State v. Wyer, 320 S.E.2d 92 (W. Va. 1984), we had the first occasion to determine if
a Miranda warning was sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We surveyed the
divergent conclusions of other state and federal decisions, noting that the United States Supreme
Court had not decided the issue. It subsequently decided the issue in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625 (1986), which created a higher standard than the one set in Wyer. This points to another peril
of embarking on a state constitutional basis when the Supreme Court has made no definitive judgment.
If the state decision offers insufficient protection, it has no precedential value. See State v. Barrow,
No. 16370 (W. Va. July 7, 1987) overruling Wyer.
17 Despite three volumes of debate on our 1863 Constitution, there is no debate reported on
article III, which forms the core of our state bill of rights.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/7
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are often lost to history. 18 Similar problems arise even today. Legislative records are often silent on the meaning to be ascribed to
state constitutional amendments. Perhaps the only resources available to the courts is the literature prepared by interest groups supporting or opposing a given amendment at the general election. A
court should rightly hesitate to interpret a state constitution armed
only with the words of the provision in question and obviously onesided political rhetoric.
Finally, it seems prudent to suggest that where the vast majority
of a state's constitutional cases in the area of criminal procedure
have rested on United States Supreme Court precedent, it is hardly
rational to begin to decide them anew on state constitutional grounds.
IV.

METHODOLOGY

Several approaches have been suggested as a means of justifying
state constitutional primacy. Indeed, the term "primacy" represents
one such methodology, which holds a state court should begin its
analysis with its own constitution, coupled with its history and structure, to evolve a meaning. It is generally agreed that Justice Linde
of the Oregon Supreme Court has been the most penetrating spokesman for this model. 19
Another available approach is termed the "interstitial" model.
As its name suggests, this model requires a state court to acknowledge any applicable United States Supreme Court decisions as a
floor. The court then must determine whether a higher protection
should be afforded under its state constitution. This approach enables a state court to utilize federal precedents, which it ordinarily
would not do under the primacy model.
In effect, the interstitial model allows the state court to build
on a foundation of federal precedent and then to expand protection

,SThere is no authoritative publication with regard to the 1872 Constitution.
'9 Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State's Bill of Rights, 9 U. BAT. L. REv..379
(1980); Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984); Linde,
Without "Due Process"--UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125 (1970).
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if desired on state constitutional grounds .20 A state court operating
under the interstitial model may elect not to give the federal law
any precedential weight.21 Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court has developed a list of factors to which a state court
may resort in determining whether its state constitution warrants a
departure from the federal norm. 22 It is, of course, understood that
the state may not settle its law below the federal norm.
A third recognized approach to analyzing state constitutional issues is known as the "dual sovereignty" model. It proceeds by analyzing both federal and state constitutional provisions and allowing
the state court to elect to follow the federal precedent rather than
to give elevated protection under its state constitution. On the other
hand, the state court may rely upon separate and independent grounds
to achieve a higher protection under its own constitution. 23
It should be pointed out that both the interstitial and the dual
sovereignty models carry with them a potential for application of
the principle expressed in Michigan v. Long,24 namely, that the Supreme Court will review state court decisions unless there is a "plain
statement" that the decision was grounded on state law:
[Wihen.. .a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or
to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we
will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the
case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. If
a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only

10Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 Tax. L. Rav. 1025,
1028 (1985); Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95
HAiv. L. Rnv. 1324, 1363-64 (1982).
21 Utter, supra note 20, at 1029.
22 Justice Handler, in his concurring opinion in State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982),
provided a list of seven reference points available to judges in determining whether additional protection is provided under state constitutional law. These include: (1) textual language, (2) legislative
history, (3) preexisting state law, (4) structural differences, (5) matters of particular state interest or
local concern, (6) state traditions, and (7) public attitudes.
2 Utter, supra note 20, at 1029-30.
Michigan v. Long, 63 U.S. 1032 (1983).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/7
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for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
court has reached."5

Thus, it is clear that a state court which discusses federal precedents
in its analysis, but decides the issue on its own state constitution,
must expressly state that federal law is used only for guidance and
is not controlling.
V.

WEST VIRGINIA AND THE

NEw

FEDERALISM

On several occasions, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has utilized state constitutional provisions to create higher rights
than those afforded under the federal Constitution. The remainder
of this essay will review recent West Virginia cases which have expanded protections beyond those recognized under federal constitutional law. In particular, it will examine the nature and extent of
the deviation from federal precedent and the legal rationale offered
by the court.
Perhaps the most noteworthy state-law based decision in recent
years was Pauley v. Kelly, 26 wherein it was held that article XII,
section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, providing for "a thorough and efficient system of free schools," made education a fundamental right subject to equal protection principles. Under the
court's analysis in Pauley, an educational funding system based upon
discriminatory classifications would be subject to strict scrutiny and
sustained only upon a showing of a compelling state interest. This
was the same position taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
1973 under its "thorough and efficient" clause in Robinson v. Cahill.27 The United States Supreme Court has declined to find education
28
to be a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection analysis.
The state supreme court has also concluded that article III, section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, which contains a prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment," incorporates a
proportionality principle. This holding was based in part on the

Id. at 1040-41.

Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
2 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
n San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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wording of the -state constitutional guarantee, which states that
"[p]enalties shall be proportioned" to the offense. 29 In 1980, proportionality analysis was all but excluded under the eighth amendment by the Supreme Court in Rummel v. Estelle.30 In Wanstreet
v. Bordenkircher,31 decided one year after Rummel, the West Virginia court rejected the federal approach. It traced a line of state
cases and concluded that a heightened concern for the proportionality of sentences existed by reason of our different constitutional
language. 32
Similarly, the West Virginia court held in syllabus point 1 of
State ex rel. Harper v. Zegeer33 that "[c]riminal punishment of
chronic alcoholics for public intoxication violates our State constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 34 It was
candidly acknowledged by the Harper court that its holding was at
odds with a closely divided decision by the United States Supreme
Court over a decade before in Powell v. Texas.35 However, Harper
emphasized that Justice White, the swing vote in the Powell majority, had stated in a separate opinion that if the record were better
developed he would agree that cruel and unusual punishment principles were implicated.
Language in our article III, section 14 which'states "[t]rials of
crimes, and misdemeanors . . .shall be by a jury of twelve men,"

led the West Virginia court to conclude that it provides greater protection for a jury trial than the sixth amendment. In Hendershot v.
Hendershot, 6 decided in 1980, the court held that this provision
prohibited a sentence of imprisonment for criminal contempt with-

Article III, section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution states, in part: "Penalties shall be
proportioned to the character and degree of the offence."
'Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Subsequently, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983),
the Supreme'Court distinguished Rummel and recognized a proportionality principle implicit in the

Eighth Amendment.
1X Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981).
32 For

other cases discussing proportionality, see, e.g., State v. Buck, 314 S.E.2d 406 (W.Va.

1984); State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1983).
31 State ex rel. Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1982).
34

Id. at 873.

3SPowell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Hendershot v. Hendershot, 164 W. Va. 190, 263 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
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out a jury trial. Extensive historical precedents were marshalled in
Hendershot including the very early case of State v. Cottrill,37 in
which the court held that the same constitutional provision mandated
a jury trial in all misdemeanor cases.
The court in Hendershot recognized that Bloom v. Illinois," a
1968 United States Supreme Court case which permitted incarceration up to six months for criminal contempt, dictated a different
result. As Hendershot explained, Bloom's holding was based on the
conclusion of two prior cases, Duncan v. Louisiana39 and Cheff v.
Schnackenberg,40 that "historically the right to a jury trial in a criminal case did not include 'petty' offenses. This term was defined in
Cheff to be an offense for which the punishment does not exceed
a six-month confinement." ' 4 ! However, the specific reference in the
West Virginia constitution to "misdemeanors" foreclosed the "petty"
offense concept. Also helpful in buttressing Hendershot's analysis
were legislative enactments, dating from the formation of the state,
which guaranteed the right to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases
where the defendant was to be imprisoned. Subsequently, in Champ
v. McGhee,42 the court, relying on Hendershot, held in the single
syllabus: "Under art. 3, § 14 of the West Virginia Constitution, the
right to a jury trial is accorded in both felonies and misdemeanors
when the penalty imposed inv6lves any period of incarceration."
West Virginia has likewise departed from the United States Supreme Court's conclusion that neither double jeopardy nor due process principles forecloses the imposition of an increased criminal
sentence in the event of a retrial after appeal or of an appeal de
novo. 41 State v. Eden,44 decided in 1979, involved an appeal from
a magistrate court. The principle was extended to municipal court
4
appeals five years later in State v. Bonham. 1
State v. Cottrill, 31 W. Va. 162, 6 S.E. 428 (1888).
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
" Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
• Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
41 Hendershot, 164 W. Va. at 193, 263 S.E.2d at 92.
42Champ v. McGhee, 165 W. Va. 567, 270 S.E.2d 445 (1980).
41 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
" State v. Eden, 163 W. Va. 370, 256 S.E.2d 868 (1979).
41 State v. Bonham, 317 S.E.2d 501 (,V. Va. 1984).
"

"
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Two concerns were the motivating factors in both of these decisions. First, a chilling effect is placed on the right to appeal where
the possibility exists of an enhanced sentence if the appeal proves
successful. Second, where the appeal is from a magistrate or municipal court, the procedure is not really an appeal but rather a trial
de novo. Consequently, regardless of how egregious the error was
in the underlying trial, it cannot be corrected on the "appeal." The
defendant is simply compelled to undergo a second trial faced with
the possibility of receiving an increased sentence. These matters were
of compelling concern and the court said in Bonham, they were not
addressed satisfactorily by the high court's decision, thus justifying
a departure. 46

The right of access to criminal trials by the public and press was
recognized under article III, section 1447 and section 1748 of the West
Virginia Constitution in State ex rel. HeraldMail Co. v. Hamilton49
in 1980. This decision followed Gannet Co. v. De Pasqualle,0 handed
down one year before, in which the United States Supreme Court
held that the press and public had no right under the sixth amendment's jury trial provisions to be present in the courtroom during
a criminal trial. Unlike the sixth amendment, the criminal trial guarantees under the West Virginia Constitution provide specifically that
all courts of the state "shall be open." In Herald Mail, the West
Virginia court discussed at some length the history of the "open
courts" provision as it had evolved from the English common law
into early charters and state constitutions, and concluded: "The uniform interpretation of the mandate that the courts 'shall be open'
... is that this language confers an independent right on the public

Bonham, 317 S.E.2d at 503-04.
,1In State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 165 W. Va. 103, 107, 267 S.E.2d 544, 547
n.2 (1980), the following language was quoted from article III, section 14: " 'Trials of crimes, and
46

misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, public, without

unreasonable delay . . . .' " (Emphasis in original).
41 In HeraldMail, 165 W. Va. at 103, 107, 267 S.E.2d at 547 n.2, (1980), the following language
was quoted from article III, section 17: " 'The courts of this State shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law; and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.'
'9Herald Mail, 165 W. Va. 103, 267 S.E.2d 544.
" The holding in Gannet Co. v. De Pasqualle, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) was virtually overruled in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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to attend civil and criminal trials, and not simply a right in favor
of the litigants to demand a public proceeding." 5 1 Thus, the clause
providing for "open courts" conferred a right in addition to those
provided under the more narrow language of the sixth amendment.
Finally, two other related areas should be mentioned. In Dobbs
v. Wallace 2 and Louk v. Haynes,-3 the court concluded without any
extended discussion that counsel was required at parole and probation revocation hearings, contrary to the more limited case-by4
case federal standard set in Gagnon v. Scarpelli1
In Ray v. McCoy,5 5 it was held that the provisions of article III,
section 5 of our constitution, requiring that "[n]o person shall be
transported out of, or forced to leave the State for any offence
committed within the same" operated to prevent "a prisoner convicted under West Virginia law from involuntarily serving any portion of a state sentence beyond the West Virginia borders." 5 6 The
United States Supreme Court, in the 1983 case of Olim v. Wakinekona,5 7 concluded that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment did not foreclose such a transfer from one state to another without a hearing. It is apparent that our more express constitutional language accounts for the distinction betweey Ray and
Olim.
These cases should not be read to imply a willingness by the
West Virginia court to simply abandon federal precedent in favor
58
of a state-based analysis. Nearly ten years ago, in State v. Adams,
the court held that the admission in a criminal trial of a defendant's
refusal to submit to a breathalyzer was a violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination under both the United States and West
Virginia constitutions. This holding was made in the absence of any
controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court. Some

Herald Mail, 165
11

W. Va. at 110, 267 S.E.2d at 548.
Dobbs v. Wallace, 157 W. Va. 405, 201 S.E.2d 914 (1974).
1 Louk v. Haynes, 159 W. Va. 482, 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976).
14 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Ray v. McCoy, 321 S.E.2d 90 (,V. Va. 1984).
56 Id. at 92.
' Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
' State v. Adams, 162 W. Va. 150, 247 S.E.2d 475 (1978).
:2
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five years later, the high court held in South Dakota v. Neville59

that the admission of such refusal evidence was not a violation of
the fifth- amendment. In light of Neville and subsequent state cases

which formed a clear majority rule against Adams, this issue was
reexamined in State v. Cozart;60 and Adams was overruled.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This review of West Virginia cases lends itself to several observations. Undoubtedly, the court has recognized the basic concepts
inherent in the New Federalism. This has been accomplished in two
major areas. First, the court has shown an awareness of areas of
traditional state concern and has been willing to extend broader
protection. Thus, for example, the "thorough and efficient" clause
in our -constitution was held to embody a heightened concern for
education and educational funding which warranted strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis. Second, where the state constitution
uses wording which provides protections over and above federal
guarantees, the court has shown a willingness to implement it by
developing its own state-law jurisprudence. The express provision of
a proportionality principle in article III, section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution has led the court to consider whether a given
criminal sentence is disproportionate. Similarly, the "open courts"
language in our counterpart to the sixth amendment was held to
confer rights on persons other than the criminal defendant, despite
federal law to the contrary.
These cases demonstrate a willingness to establish an independent
state constitutional basis where the constitutional language suggests
an enhanced right. The Cozart decision in 1986 overruling Adams,
however, stands as a reminder of the court's unwillingness to maintain a higher standard when it is contrary to later Supreme Court
precedent and that adopted by the majority of other states.
What does this bode for the future? I believe that our state
constitutional jurisprudence will continue to grow. This is partic11South

Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).

0 State v. Cozart, 352 S.E.2d 152 (fV. Va. 1986).
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ularly so in matters of strong state or local interest. Its growth,
however, will be limited to some extent by the fact that the court
has not fully embraced the New Federalism to any marked degree.
Thus, only where our constitution has distinctive language can it be
expected that a substantial variance with federal precedent will occur.
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